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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Supreme 
Court under Article VII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i); and Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this being a discretionary appeal from an interlocutory 
ruling of the District Court. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in failing to include Plaintiff's 
employer on the Special Jury Verdict Form for purposes of 
apportioning its fault with reference to the subject accident? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are believed to be 
determinative of the issue presented above: 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 35-1-60 (1990); 
UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 78-27-37, et. seq. (1990); 
Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The contents of the above-cited authorities are fully set forth in 
the Addendum to this brief, in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceeding 
and Disposition in the Lower Court. 
Plaintiff, Jodie Dahl, commenced this action, seeking recovery 
for personal injuries allegedly sustained when tripping over a 
trench cut in the concrete floor at her place of employment, the 
Albertsons Distribution Center in North Salt Lake, Utah. Named as 
Defendants were Epstein Construction, Inc., the construction 
manager for the project, and Kerbs Construction Corp., a 
subcontractor who was directly responsible for cutting the subject 
trench. (Record 1-2). 
In addition to denying specific allegations of the Complaint, 
the Defendants affirmatively alleged contributory negligence on 
Plaintiff's part and also comparative negligence on the part of her 
employer, Albertsons. (R.13-17). A Cross-Claim was also brought 
by Epstein against Kerbs, seeking indemnity and insurance coverage 
for any judgment rendered against it in Plaintiff's favor, pursuant 
to the terms of the construction contract between those parties. 
(R. 103-111). 
Facts uncovered during the course of discovery supported the 
principle that Albertsons subjected its employees to hazards 
associated with the construction work by having them perform tasks 
in the area of on-going construction. As a result of this evidence 
of comparative negligence, Epstein filed a Motion to Include 
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Albertsons on the special verdict form. (R. 565). Shortly 
thereafter, Defendant Kerbs joined in such motion, which was 
initially granted by District Judge Cornaby. (R. 701). However, 
upon a review of the issue in the context of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Judge Cornaby reversed his earlier determination 
and refused to permit the negligence of Albertsons to be assessed 
by the jury. (R. 749-750). 
Following Judge Cornabyfs refusal to certify the decision as 
a final judgment, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(b), Epstein 
and Kerbs sought review through a Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal, which was granted by Order of the Supreme Court on November 
12, 1991. Due to the importance of the issue to be resolved 
through this appeal, trial of the District Court case, originally 
set for December 12, 1991, has been stayed on motion of the 
Defendants. (R. 978-979 and 982-983). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the month of February, 1989, and periods prior thereto, 
Epstein Construction acted as a construction manager with respect 
to a remodelling project at Albertsons' North Salt Lake City 
Distribution Center. Among the remodelling work to be performed 
under the parties' contract was the installation of new banana 
storage rooms. (R. 265). Epstein let a subcontract to Kerbs 
Construction under which they saw-cut a trench in the concrete 
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floor of the Distribution Center for purposes of placing utility 
lines and the banana room walls. (R. 266). 
While construction was being performed and after the trench 
had been cut, Albertsons continued to require employees to perform 
tasks in the area immediately adjacent to the construction 
vicinity. In the course of a day, employees would regularly 
traverse the floor slot. (R. 522). The decision to place workers 
in the potentially hazardous construction area was made by Frank 
Payan, Albertsons' warehouse manager. (R. 524). In fact, so as to 
allow employees to work in the construction area, Albertsons 
specifically precluded the contractors from taking protective 
measures, including to barricade the subject trench. (R. 588). 
Even workers' complaints as to the hazards associated with working 
in the area were ignored by the employer. Plaintiff testified that 
her supervisor responded to a complaint by stating "You guys quit 
your bitching and get your asses over there and get to work." (R. 
883). 
On February 14, 1989, Plaintiff fell backward over the trench, 
suffering the injuries complained of in these proceedings. 
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the accident, she suffered a 
herniated disk and other physical complications. (R. 2). It is 
undisputed that Plaintiff received workers compensation benefits 
for her injuries. (R. 3). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court found the legal position of the Plaintiff 
"appears more reasonable" and, hence, excluded Albertsons, her 
employer, from the special verdict form. Contrary to the Court's 
ruling, such is neither the majority rule nor better reasoned law. 
Rather, it is violative of the sound equitable principle of holding 
a defendant accountable for only its proportionate share of fault, 
particularly as expressed in Utah comparative negligence statutes. 
The District Judge's ruling was erroneous and Albertsons must be 
included on the special verdict form to reach a well-considered 
judgment in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Undisputed evidence in our case indicates Albertsons 
knowingly exposed employees to a potentially dangerous condition, 
resulting from remodeling work being performed at its Distribution 
Warehouse and refused to permit the contractors to take preventive 
measures. Despite workers' complaints, Albertsons supervisors 
ordered Jodie Dahl to perform work tasks immediately adjacent to an 
uncovered cut in the concrete floor. Accepting the truth of 
Plaintiff's allegations, working in this area caused her to 
accidently trip and fall over the slot, sustaining the complained 
of injuries. Hence, this is not an instance where the Defendants 
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are merely trying to cloud the issue of their negligence. Instead, 
there is substantial evidence of fault here on the employer's part 
making this an appropriate case to address the issue. Nonetheless, 
due to the Court's ruling on the motion to include Albertsons on 
the jury verdict form, Defendants/Appellants Epstein and Kerbs face 
possible liability for a judgment far in excess of their 
proportionate degree of fault. This is a result incompatible with 
Utah's comparative negligence scheme and sound policy 
considerations as well. 
As a case of first impression in the appellate system, the 
Supreme Court should review this matter and find that an employer's 
negligence can be determined by the trier-of-fact when entering a 
judgment in proceedings such as these. 
A. Utah's Comparative Negligence 
Statute Mandates the Inclusion of 
An Employer on a Special Verdict Form 
There is little question that an employer owes employees a 
duty to provide a reasonably safe and hazard-free workplace. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.r 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). There is 
likewise little doubt that an employer may breach the 
aforementioned duty, and, hence, be held accountable for 
negligence. However, in order to strike a balance in favor of 
compensating employees for work-related injuries, the Legislature 
has granted employers immunity from negligence actions, so long as 
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the employer has complied with obligations imposed under the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act, codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60. 
Immunity granted under the Worker's Compensation Act has been 
extended to claims of contribution and implied indemnity in third-
party actions brought by non-employer defendants when sued by the 
injured employee. See, generally, Freund v» Utah Power & Light 
Co.
 f 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). The important question raised by 
this appeal is whether the employers' immunity and consequential 
non-joinder as a party tort-feasor precludes an apportionment of 
their fault under Utah's comparative negligence scheme and special 
verdict provisions. It is respectfully urged that such 
apportionment is not contrary to the Worker's Compensation Act, but 
is mandated and entirely consistent with tort reform principles 
adopted in Utah. 
The sound underlying principle of comparative negligence in 
Utah is announced in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40, which provides: 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled 
to contribution from any other person. 
Furthermore, § 78-27-38 states ". . .No defendant is liable to any 
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportionate of fault attributable to that defendant." In order 
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to determine a defendant's 'proportion of fault', the Act relies on 
the use of special verdicts which find "the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking relief and 
to each defendant". § 78-27-39 (Emphasis added). 
Based on the special verdict statute, Respondent argued 
successfully in the District Court that because Albertsons, the 
employer, cannot be made a party-defendant, it likewise cannot be 
placed on the special verdict form for purposes of determining its 
percentage of fault. This proposition is contrary to Utah law and 
a majority of other jurisdictions. 
While not passing on the precise issue presented here, the 
Utah Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions, allowed the 
jury's consideration of a non-party's negligence. For instance, in 
Godesky v, Provo City Corpt, supra, the court let stand, without 
express comment, the jury finding that the employer was negligent 
and proportionately responsible for causing the accident. 
Similarly, in Bishop v. Neilsenf 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981), the 
court permitted contribution against an arguably immune party, 
finding it a "joint tort-feasor". Also instructive is the case of 
Madsen v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 
1982), where this court stated: 
It is imperative that the issue of 
proportionate fault should be litigated 
between all joint tort-feasors in the same 
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action and resolved by the same trier of the 
issues of fact. 
This was despite the fact the joint tort-feasor was an immune 
governmental entity. 
The import of the foregoing authority is that regardless of 
possible immunity, defendants joined in the action are entitled to 
a determination of a joint tort-feasor's fault so that party-
defendants are only liable for their percentage of negligence.1 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this 
issue in the context of an employer, the clear weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions has extended general comparative 
negligence principles to entities situated as Albertsons. 
One of the first cases addressing the issue of apportioning an 
immune employer's negligence on a jury verdict form is Connar Vt 
West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee. Inc.. 227 N.W. 2d 660, 662 
(Wisconsin 1975). 
It is established without doubt that, when 
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all 
parties to the transaction, whether or not 
xThis is a position which has been adopted by the Utah 
Attorney General's office. In response to an inquiry from Federal 
Magistrate Calvin Gould, in the context of a case entitled Yantes 
v. Signode Corp.r Civil No. 89 NC 0055-S, the Attorney Generalfs 
office stated "the immunity of an employer is in no way impaired by 
being joined for the purposes of apportioning fault." Sfifi, 
Appendix B hereto. It is also the opinion adopted by numerous 
federal and state district court judges from Utah. £££ various 
orders and ruling gathered at Appendix B. 
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they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or 
not they can be liable to the Plaintiff or to 
the other tort-feasors, either by operation of 
law or because of a prior release. 
Referring to this Wisconsin rule as being "clearly the prevalent 
practice among state courts", the Idaho Supreme Court, in Pocatello 
Industrial Park Co. v. Steel Westr Inc.r 621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho 
1980), construed a comparative negligence special verdict statute 
almost identical to Utah's: 
The court may, and when requested by any 
party, shall, direct the jury to find separate 
special verdicts determining the amount of 
damages and the percentage of negligence 
attributable to each party . . . I.C. §6-802. 
Acknowledging that the employer could not be made a "party" to the 
proceedings, the court, nonetheless, held its negligence should be 
apportioned by the jury. 
While the statute requires the parties be 
included in the special verdict, it does not 
state that only parties shall be included. 
661 P.2d. 403.2 
Among other states which have allowed an apportionment of 
fault, in the context of comparative negligence of an otherwise 
immune entity or non-party are: Wyoming, Kirby Building Systems v.. 
Mineral Explorations
 r 704 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Wyo. 1985) ("The 
2At least one commentator has noted that the Utah comparative 
negligence statute is almost identical to the Idaho Act construed 
in Pocatello Industrial Park. £fi£, Thode, Comparative Negligence, 
Contribution Among Tort-Feasors and the Effect of a Release - a 
Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 406 (1973). 
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requirement that all participants' fault be ascertained means that 
the fault of non-party actors, as well as party tort-feasors, must 
be calculated by the fact finder."); Kansas, Brown v. Keillr 580 
P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978); Indiana, Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508 
(S.D. Ind. 1987) (Immune governmental entities' fault must be 
apportioned by jury under Indiana's comparative negligence 
statutes); North Carolina, Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. 
305 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1983); Illinois, Hall v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co.r 491 N.E.2d 879 (111. App. 1986); and, New Mexico, 
Tavlor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc.f 667 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1983). 
The more recent trend of apportioning the negligence of an 
immune employer in a third-party action instituted by an employee 
was expressly adopted by California courts in Mills v. MMM Carpets, 
Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. App. 6th 1991). There, a bank 
employee sought recovery for personal injuries from a building 
manager and owner and a carpet installer. The court held 
apportionment of the employer's negligence did not run afoul of the 
employer's general immunity from tort liability. JA. at 818. In 
construing the statute (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (A)) which read, 
quite like Utah's, 
Each defendant shall be liable only for the 
amount of non-economic damages allocated to 
that defendant in direct proportion to that 
defendant's percentage of fault. 
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the court held the equation "does not vary according to the 
presence or absence as parties of other tort-feasors in a given 
case . . . . It instead most readily suggests comparison with the 
fault of the entire field of tort-feasors." 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
816-817. 
Although contribution against an employer was commonly 
rejected prior to passage of pure comparative negligence laws, most 
states still permit an allocation of the employer's fault. For 
instance, in the recent case of Williams v. White Mountain 
Construction Co.r 749 P.2d 423, 429 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado 
Supreme Court disallowed contribution, yet held: 
Tort-feasors sued by injured employees are now 
able to present evidence of employer liability 
at trial, so as to reduce whatever damages may 
be assessed against them to a level 
proportionate to their liability. 
In ClarK V, PacifiCQrp, 809 P.2d 176 (Wash. 1991), the appeal 
of a state court action and a question certified from the federal 
court were consolidated. At issue was RCW 4.22.070(1), which 
provided: 
In all actions involving fault of more than 
entity, the trier of fact shall determine the 
percentage of the total fault which is 
attributable to every entity which caused the 
claimant's damages, including the claimant 
. . . third-party defendants . . . [and] 
entities immune from liability. 
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In the primary case, Clark had filed a wrongful death action 
against Pacificorp, who had hired the decedent's employer to trim 
trees away from power lines. Under the Washington Worker's 
Compensation Act, the employer was immune from liability and could 
not be named as a party to the action. Pacificorp sought a 
determination of the employer's comparative negligence and 
corresponding reduction of damages. Under those circumstances, 
identical to ours, the court held: 
A trier of fact shall apportion fault to all 
at-fault entities in accordance with RCW 
4.22.070. This includes the injured worker or 
beneficiary, the employer and the third-party. 
Each party shall then pay his proportionate 
share of damages. 
Id. at 179. (Emphasis added). Cf. Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 
652 P.2d 948, 953 (Wash. 1982) (Contribution claim against employer 
barred prior to enactment of the comparative negligence statute 
"even though requiring one wrong-doer to shoulder all the damages 
when the other wrong-doer is an employer may be unfair . . . " ) . 
The Utah special verdict statute can be construed to exclude 
consideration of an employer's negligence, arguably applying only 
to "each person seeking recovery and to each defendant". UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-39. But, as the Idaho court found in Pocatello 
Industrial Park, the statute "does not state that only parties 
shall be included". 621 P.2d 403. Furthermore, the key phrase 
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"person seeking recovery" in the special verdict statute is 
sufficiently broad to encompass employers. 
Per UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(3), "persons seeking recovery" 
are those "seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or 
on behalf on another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative". (Emphasis added.) Under the Utah Workerf s 
Compensation Act, an employer is the "trustee of the cause of 
action against the third party" and may maintain an action on its 
own behalf or in the name of the injured employee. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 35-1-62. The statute goes on to provide that the employer will 
be reimbursed for compensation payments even before an injured 
employee recovers. As such, the employer is a person seeking 
recovery under § 78-27-39, who should be included on the special 
verdict f >rm. 
B. Considerations of Equity and 
Fairness Require an Employer's 
Negligence to Be Apportioned. 
One of the acknowledged purposes of comparative negligence is 
to ameliorate the harsh consequences of traditional contributory 
negligence and joint and several liability among defendants. See, 
generally, Jansen v. Intermountain Health Carer Inc.. 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984). Appellants Epstein and Kerbs face a strong 
possibility that if Albertsons1 degree of fault is not taken into 
account by the jury, they will be liable for a disproportionate 
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percentage of responsibility as joint tort-feasors• The 
appropriate means of remedying this unheralded result is to 
overrule Judge Cornaby's decision. 
Recognition of the salutary purpose expressed above is 
essential in construing the special verdict statute. See, Mills Vt 
MMM Carpetsf supra. As in Mills, the result here sought by 
Plaintiff and "adopted by the trial court would re-write the 
statute to provide that the Defendants' percentage of fault was to 
be measured in relation to the fault of only other Defendants in 
the action. The statutory language does not invoke such a limited 
comparison." 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817. 
In the Kansas case of Brown v. Keill. supra, the court 
addressed the argument that apportioning a non-parties' negligence 
would be unfair to a plaintiff. The argument was rejected, in 
part, realizing that by enacting comparative negligence statutes, 
legislatures had relieved plaintiffs of the potentially harsh all-
or-nothing recovery notions which result from contributory 
negligence rules. In essence, the burden and potential unfairness 
of contesting a non-party's responsibility is offset by eliminating 
the risk of non-recovery existing under contributory negligence. 
The court went on to acknowledge "the law governing tort liability 
will never be a panacea." Id. at 874. With this in mind, the 
legislature's intent in adopting comparative negligence was to 
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relay duty to pay to the degree of fault• Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inct, supra. The only means of fulfilling this 
purpose in our circumstances is to permit a jury to determine the 
employer's fault, through the special verdict, which will leave 
Appellants Epstein and Kerbs responsible for only their respective 
percentages of fault. 
Even prior to adoption of pure comparative negligence 
principles, courts expressed concern and railed against the 
inequity of denying a defendant, such as Epstein, the right to 
plead or prove an employer's concurrent negligence in an action 
brought by an injured employee. In an effort to strike a 
compromise between the competing interests of employer immunity, 
compensating an injured employee and yet permitting defendants, 
such as Epstein, a sort of quasi-contribution, courts devised a 
number of mechanisms. For instance, in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 
187 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir. 1951), reversed on other grounds, Halcyon 
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. , 342 U.S. 282 (1952), 
the court limited contribution against an employer to that sum 
which it had been liable to pay the employee through worker's 
compensation. 
Another method a number of courts employed was that of 
reducing the injured employee's recovery by sums received through 
the worker's compensation claim. 3fi£, generally, Murray Vt United 
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States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. App. 1968). Pennsylvania, by contrast, 
limited the same to the amount of the employer's liability under 
the Workers Compensation Act- Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 
216 A.2d 318 (Pa. 1966). The New York Court of Appeals in Pole v« 
Dow Chemical Co.f 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972), allowed indemnity 
over against a negligent employer in an amount proportionate to its 
share of fault. This approach was similarly adopted in Skinner v. 
Reed-Prentice Package Machinery Co.. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977). 
Fortunately, Utah's comparative negligence statutes do away 
with the need to adopt a flawed result-oriented analysis to achieve 
a fair allocation of the various parties' responsibility for an 
employee's injuries. A trial judge may place the issue of an 
employer's fault before the jury on the special verdict form and, 
thereby, arrive at a recovery corresponding to each particular 
defendant's degree of fault. Interests of compensating the 
employee and maintaining the employer's immunity are preserved 
inviolate. 
There is another sound policy consideration supporting 
apportionment of the employer's negligence, to wit: preventing a 
double recovery by the employee. Through a plaintiff's worker's 
compensation benefits, an employee is reimbursed for most if not 
all economic losses associated with the injury, for instance, lost 
wages and medical expenses. Without question in the employee's 
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third-party action, he may once again recover the same damages, 
subject only to an employer's or the insurance fund's rights of 
subrogation. Thus, there is a very real risk of a prohibited 
double recovery. 
It may be argued, however, that by apportioning an employer's 
negligence, these subrogation rights are unfairly prejudiced. The 
proposition is fallacious, because as an elementary subrogation 
principle, a subrogee must not himself be at fault or contributing 
to the loss on which he sues. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 
§ 75.23 (1990). 
It is clear that allocating an employer's fault in a third-
party suit brought by an injured employee is supported by the sound 
policy considerations behind Utah's comparative negligence scheme. 
Specifically, no single tort-feasor should be responsible for a 
disproportionate share of liability. Nor does apportionment unduly 
prejudice the Plaintiff or impair subrogation rights. Albertsons, 
Jodie Dahl's employer, should be included on the Special Jury 
Verdict Form in order to reach a just result in our case. The only 
means of doing so is to overrule District Judge Cornaby's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court erred in 
excluding Plaintiff's employer, Albertsons, from the special jury 
verdict form for purposes of apportioning its fault with respect to 
18 
the subject accident. Such is contrary to Utah's Comparative 
Negligence scheme and sound policy considerations as well. 
Respectfully submitted this <po— day of January, 1992. 
Michael A. Katz <C_ 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104 
Attorneys for Appellant, Epstein 
Construction, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchiine following § 35-1-46. 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 5 
78-27-37- Definitions. 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, of on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 1. dimtnishment of damages and assumption of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, risk, and rcenacts the above section, 
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
oJin^R11 °f a P e r S ° n S ere l d n g r e c o v e r 3 ' shaII not aione bar recovery by that 
S L S H T ' rGC0Vu f r ° m 3 n y ^ e f e n d a n t or group of defendant whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
thatVdefen°dr T ^ ^ *" ^  ° f t h e P r ° P ° r t i ° n ° f f a u ^ a t t r i b u t e tf 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale ia substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
78-27-39, Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to 
con&ibution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-
*acts* the above section. 
78-27-40- Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, S 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts 
the above section. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of con-
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 69(h). 
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq. 
78-27-41. J o i n d e r of d e f e n d a n t s . 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, 
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 5. rights of contribution and indemnity, and reen-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, acts the above section, 
ch. 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-
78-27-42, Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does 
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 6. release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, claim, and reenacts the above section, 
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common 
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limitecLto, gov-
ernmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive 
remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 
78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising 
from statute, contract, or agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
 m 19?, § 9 provided: "If any provision of 
1986, ch. 199, § 7. * §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applica-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, tion of any provisions of those sections to any 
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as en- person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to
 maining provisions of those sections shall be 
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution,
 g i v c n e f f e c t w i t h o u t ^e i n v a H d p r o v i s i o n o r 
and reenacts the above section. application " 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch. 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories. 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special 
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that 
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several 
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evi-
dence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring 
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall 
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus 
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue. If iri so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of 
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission 
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a 
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The 
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general 
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of 
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or 
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to 
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct 
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When 
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judg-
ment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A. 
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsis-
tent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A 
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the 
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other 
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment 
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consider-
ation of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
JODIE DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KERBS CONSTRUCTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE ALBERTSONS 
Civil No, 900746945 
The plaintiff has moved to exclude Albertsons from the 
special verdict form. The defendants oppose the motion. 
On February 26, 1991, Epstein Construction moved the Court 
to include Albertsons on the special verdict form. On March 13, 
1991, Kerbs Construction Company joined in that motion. On 
March 13, 1991, the Court received Epstein's notice to submit 
for decision. The motion was supported by a brief that was well 
reasoned and supported by law from both Idaho and Wisconsin. 
Since the plaintiff apparently was not objecting the Court 
granted the motion. 
The rule of law involved has not been adjudicated in Utah. 
Albertsons is not a party to the action and cannot be made one 
because of the Workman's Compensation law. Apparently, the 
majority of jurisdictions would exclude Albertsons from the 
special verdict form because it is not a party and cannot be 
made a party. On the other hand, Idaho and Wisconsin rule that 
the fault of all persons contributing to an accident should "be 
presented to the jury under comparative negligence law. 
The plaintiff was not diligent in responding to defendants' 
motion to include Albertsons. Yet, the legal position of the 
plaintiff appears more reasonable to the Court. The defendants 
point out that there is no such thing as a motion for 
reconsideration in Utah- This rule works well when the Court 
has made factual findings, but not so well when, as here, no one 
is hurt by the application of the better reasoned law-
In spite of the Court's prior ruling, it now rules that 
Albertsons shall be excluded from the special jury verdict. 
Regardless of the outcome of the case, the plaintiff's attorney 
is responsible for defendants' attorney fees in conjunction with 
responding to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 
The plaintiff is directed to file a formal order with the 
Court. 
Dated June 27, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
Y^L , 
Certificate of Mailing: • 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
James R. Hasenyager 
2661 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Gary D. Stott 
George T. Naegle 
P. 0. Box 2465 
SLC, UT 84110-2465 
J. Nick Crawford 
Suite 202 3rd Floor 
39 Post Office Place 
SLC, UT 84101-2104 
Dated this day of June 1991, 
Deputy Ql^rk 
Honorable Calvin Gould 
United States Courthouse 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Yantes v. Signode Corporation, et al., Civil No. 
89 NC-0055-S 
Dear Magistrate Gould: 
The question of constitutionality of the exclusive 
remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-60, and of the 
comparative negligence provision which preserves statutory 
immunities, Utah Code Ann. 5 78-27-43, has been certified to the 
Utah Attorney General. The purpose of this letter is to respond 
to your December 20, 1989 inquiry to Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen Sorenson as to whether this office will take action in 
support of the statutes. 
It appears that a constitutional challenge would arise 
only if the exclusive remedy provision prevented the joining of 
an employer for apportionment of fault• 
Since the exclusive remedy provision, Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-60, accomplishes its purpose by providing that "no action at 
law (i.e., action for money damages) may be maintained against 
an employer, there is no conflict with joining an employer solely 
to apportion fault, a proceeding which cannot impose a money 
judgment: on the employer. Therefore, there being no statutory 
language giving an employer immunity from suit but only immunity 
from money damages, the immunity of an employer is in no way 
impaired by being joined for the purpose of apportioning fault. 
The foregoing statutes not being inconsistent on their 
face nor in their purpose or application, this office believes an 
issue as to their constitutionality will not be presented. No 
steps will therefore be taken by the Attorney General to 
intervene in this action at this time. 
Honorable Calvin Gould 
January 12, 1990 
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Thank you for your courtesies in allowing us time to 
assess the need for formal participation by our office. 
Your/ veir^trjlly, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
JRS/sh 
c c : Rober t S. Campbell, Esq. 
S teven G. For sy th , Esq, 
George T. Waddoups, Esq. 
310 South Main S t r e e t , Su i te 1200 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
Gary L. Johnson, Esq. 
50 South Main, Sui te 700 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84144 
P h i l i p S. Ferguson, Esq. 
175 South West Temple, Su i te 510 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
w. 9 r e n t Wilcox, Esq. 
136 South Main S t ree t 
500 Kearns Building 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
Roger P. Baron, Esq. 
45 North F i r s t East 
Brigham C i t y , Utah 84302 
Stephen J . Sorenson, Esq. 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
236 S t a t e Cap i to l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
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BY ^ J j M . ClEflK 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ?fitf^ftE^I§TRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BETTY THOMPSON, 
P l a i n t i f f ( s ) , 
vs. 
THE CANTEEN, aka CANTEEN COR-
PORATION, a Delaware c o r p o r -
a t i o n , 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Civil No- 90-NC-0068-S 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter is before the court on defendants objection to 
the order of the magistrate denying the Canteen's Motion to Compare 
Fault of Thiokol Corporation, Defendant, the Canteen, operated a 
restaurant at the Thiokol facility at all times relevant to this 
lawsuit. Plaintiff, Betty Thompson, an employee of Thiokol, 
slipped and fell in the Canteen severely injuring her hip. She 
then sued the Canteen. 
The Canteen has requested that this court allow a special 
verdict form which will require the jury to apportion fault, not 
only among the parties, but also the non-party Thiokol. The 
\ 
magistrate concluded that such apportionment is not permitted by 
Utah law and entered an Order to that effect. 
The Canteen objected to both the order and its designation as 
an "Order" suggesting that it ought to have been styled a Report & 
Recommendation (R&R)• This court cannot conduct a de novo review 
of an order, but is limited by the "clearly erroneous or contrary 
to law" standard of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). An R&R, on the 
other hand, is subject to a de novo review when a party files an 
objection as provided by Rule 72. 
This court concludes that the magistrate was correct in 
designating the'decision an "Order." The rules provide that an R&R 
can only be entered on dispositive matters such as motions to 
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) 
(A) (1982). A motion to compare fault does not fall within that 
catugory of dispositive motions. Accordingly, this court has 
conducted the review permitted by the Federal Rules and finds the 
magistrate's order to be clearly erroneous and contrary to law. 
The plaintiff, Ms. Thompson, argued to the magistrate that the 
fault of the employer Thiokol should not be apportioned based on 
the language of Utah Code Annotated section 78-27-39 which states: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special 
verdicts determining the total amount of damages sus-
tained and the percentage or proportion of fault attrib-
utable to each person seeking recovery and to each 
defendant* 
Ms* Thompson takes the position that the language permits appor-
tionment only among defendants in the action* Ms. Thompson finds 
support for this position in Judge Minderfs decision in Smith v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. C-88-497W (D. Utah 
June 2, 1989). 
This court concludes that Ms. Thompson's position requires too 
restrictive a reading of the Utah statute. While the language of 
the statute expressly permits proportioning fault among the 
parties, nothing in the statute prohibits a jury from allocating a 
percentage of fault to a non-party. The magistrate's order also 
permits a result which runs contrary to Utah Code Annotated section 
78-27-38 ("no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery 
for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant") and Utah Code Annotated section 78-27-40 ("The 
maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion on the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to 
that defendant."). 
3 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly resolved this 
issue, two lower courts have done so and it is this courtfs view 
that the decisions of those courts are indicative of the interpre-
tation the Utah Supreme Court would give Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-27-39. In Fillmore v. Santa Fe Equipment Co., No. C87-
6488, slip. op. at 2 (3rd Dist. Ct. Utah May 9, 1990), Judge Young 
granted defendant's motion to apportion fault. According to Judge 
Young, "the court finds that the Liability Reform Act was intended 
by the legislature to limit a tortfeasor's liability to his 
proportionate share of fault as found by the finder of fact and 
that the fault of all tortfeasors, including the employer's, must 
be apportioned to accomplish this result." Judge Draney of the 
Eighth District Court reached the same conclusion in Lindsev v-
Vovles Transportation Co.. No. 89 CV 134D (8th Dist* Ct. Utah April 
11, 1990). See also Thompson v. Timpanoaos Metals. No. 89-C-0492A 
(D. Utah May 10, 1990) . 
4 
In l i g h t of the conclusions reached by Utah courts on i s sues 
i d e n t i c a l t o the one at bar, the court reconsiders the magistrate 's 
order and grants the Canteen's motion t o compare fau l t of Thiokol. 
DATED t h i s J /^/*day of W^-^-n . 19 9/.. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID SAM 
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 
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v.. . , i«n UOUN1Y. UTAH 
. -• FEB - 3 Tagn 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUTU Uk Ul.UAa~€OONTY 
STATE OF UTAH PA BY 
iA'sWjd. CLEn<< 
DEPL 
ELIAS VERDUZCO, 
Plaintiff , 
v s . 
NAT 
for: 
Ste 
DRI 
o f 
EX? 
ZONAL SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. 
rnerly a d i v i s i o n of Armco 
e l Corporation, CHASE 
LLING COMPANY, a subsidiary 
KOCH INDUSTRIES, and KOCH 
LORATION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
C i v i l No. 8 9-CV-117U 
Based on the motion of Defendant National Supply Company, 
I n c . to add th ird-party defendant, and good cause appearing, i t 
i s hereby ordered that the t r i er of fact in t h i s matter w i l l be 
a l l c v e d to cons ider anv a l l seed r.eclicence of P l a i n t i f f ' s 
;ver —n arrz.vmc an atccrt—cnment cz zz.' 
DATED t h i s <$3£2-day of February, 1990. 
3Y THE COURT: 
T 
cc: Glenn C. Hanni 
Robert M. McRae 
Roger ?. Christensen 
GARY B. FERGUSON [A1062] 
JOHN c. MCKINLEY CASSIS] 
RICHARDS,.. BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Third-Party Defendant _
 m ^ 
G r a a o l l Cons truct ion Company R E C u ' * ' 1 ' ' ^ - 3 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor ' 
SO S o u t h Main S t r e e t 
P.O. Box 2465 MAY 3 1SS0 
S a l t Lake C i t v , Utah 84110 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-1777 *.-. . 
ALCCM J. A u J i r t i C N 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT Or UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MICHAEL THOMPSON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
TIMPANOGCS METALS, a 
Ccr -=cra t i cn ; UNITED S 
CF AMERICA AND ITS AG 
UNITED STATES ARMY cc 
ENGINEERS, and DOES I 
XVI CORPORATIONS I-X, 
Defendants . 
Utah 
TATES 
ENTS; 
^ ^?C ** T 
<i, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Third-Party 
v s . 
GRAMOLL CONSTRUCTION 
and TIMPANOGCS METALS 
Plaintiff 
COMPANY 
, INC. , 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
' / 
/ 
/ 
,/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
ORDER DISMISSING 
GRAMOLL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
C i v i l No. 33-C-:432A 
/ 
Third-Party Defendants/ 
The third-party defendant Gramoll Construction 
Company's Motion to Dismiss and the Court's review of the 
p a r t i e s 1 attempt to dismiss by s t ipu la t ion Gramoll 
Construct ion Company, came on for hearing pursuant to proper 
n o t i c e , before the Eonorable Aldon J* Anderson, United Sta tes 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge, on Apri l 23, 1990 at the hour of 11:30 
a.m. The p l a i n t i f f was represented by John Call; the 
t h i r d - p a r t y defendant Timpancgos Metals, Inc. was represented 
by Robert Henderson; the United States of America was 
represented by Stephen Sorenson; and Gramoll Construction 
Company was represented by Gary B. Ferguson and John C. 
McKinley. 
After hearing oral argument, and reviewing the 
p l ead ings on f i l e , the Court ordered as follows: 
1. Gramoll Construction Companyfs Motion to 
Dismiss i s granted, thereby dismissing i t , with 
prejudice, 
2. The f inder of fact wi l l be allowed zo 
apportion the f a u l t or negligence, i f any, of 
Gramoll Construction Company which negligence or 
f a u l t may have proximately caused the in jur ies 
sustained by the p l a i n t i f f and for which he i s 
seeking damages in t h i s act ion. Any fault or 
negligence apportioned to Gramoll Construction 
Company by the f inder of fact wi l l resul t in a 
prorata reduction of t o t a l damages equal to the 
2 
percentage of negligence or fault attributed to 
Gramoll Construction Company times the total 
damages awarded by the finder of fact against all 
defendants. 
3. No costs are awarded Gramoll Construction 
Company. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and 
decreed that judgment be entered in favor of Gramoll 
Construction Company, for no cause of action on the Third-Party 
Complaint, and that Gramoll Construction Company and the 
third-party plaintiff are to bear their respective costs and 
disbursements. 
DATED this /Q day of W$/l/f~ 1990. 
3Y TEZ/COGRT: II 
Honorable A2ccr. J. Anderson 
United Stages District Court 
uzra 
MAILING CI?." 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy cf 
the foregoing instrument was sailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this ^ day of , 1990, to the 
following counsel of record. Service is aade pursuant to 
Rule 13(a)4(c) Civil Rules of Practice of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. 
Julia C. Attvood, Esc. 
PARSONS, BEHL2 i LATI2GH 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0893 
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STRONG & iLANNI 
A t u c c n e v f f a r Defendant 
Heather Wehnneistar Garrett 
S i x t h F l o o r Boston Building 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (301) 532-7080 
Peg 9 1SSS 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
ANGELA L. 3CGTT, 
P l a i n t i f f . 
v s . 
HEATHER A- WEKRMEISTER. 
VOLKSWAGENWESX 
AKTIENCESELLSCIIAFT. a foreign 
c o r p o r a t i o n , and VOLXSWAGEN OF 
AMERICA. INC. , a New Jersey 
c o r p o r a t i o n . 
Defendants . 
MAGISTRATE'S ORDER 
C i v i l No. 87-C-39SS 
Defendants* Jo in t Motion for Leave t o F i l e Third-?arty 
Camp 13 in t r w e : heard on January 11. 1329. a t 3:30 o.m. r l a i r . t t f f 
Ange la L. S c o t t was represented by her cot insei o f record David J . 
Jordan and J e f f r e y E. Nelson of Van Cott . Bag ley . Cornwall s 
McCarthy. Defendant Heather A. Wehrmeister. aka Heather G a r r e t t . 
was r e p r e s e n t e d by her counsel of record Robert A- Burton of 
S t r o n g & Hanni. Defendant voikswagen of America. I n c . was 
r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s counsel of cecocd Shawn E. Draney of Snow, 
Che i s t e n s e n £ Martineau. The court having reviewed the memoranda 
WLO 
-L-
of the pacties and having aeacd the arguments of counsel and goad 
cause appearing thsrefac. 
IT IS KEKE3Y QRDE-lED. AOJUOGED AND 0EC3EED as follows: 
i. Defendants at trial ace entitled to raise as an 
affirmative defense, pursuant to Utan Cods Annotated §73-27-37 et 
seq. the negligence of the Chi Trieiias- Sorority, its officers 
and Bricham Toung University, and defendants acs entitled to have 
the negligence and/or fault, if any, of these parties compared on 
the special verdict form submitted to the jury. 
2. Defendants zee entitled to file their third-party 
complaints but they need not file nor sacva the third-pa^ty com-
plaints in ocder to preserve their eight to have the negligence 
aevd/oc fault of the Chi tciellas Sococity, its officers and 
Dcigham "iouag university compared on the special verdict form, 
which wjii he submitted to the jury at trial. 
DATED this J { day of * <QtP<s^-. , 1*89. 
BY THE CCU&T:, 
4Vk i* « •«* • « •« • 
Sttawn £ . Dcaney 
C a u n s e i / ' f o c Volfcswage/t' oc 
GCs attys 2/10/89 tdp 
David J, Jordan, Esq. 
Roberr A^  3urton. Esq* 
H. Jams Cleqg, Esq. 
RdOecc 1\>* aurcon 
C o u n s e l for Ilea thee k. 
Wehrmeister 
wio-MObc 
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NISG 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA G. E. MORRISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EARL H. BOOTH, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 880900358 
Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Compare 
Fault, or alternatively for Leave to File a Third Party 
Complaint. The Court has reviewed the Memoranda submitted in 
connection with said Motion, and now rules as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that in order to satisfy the 
intent and purpose of the Tort Reform Act and related 
legislation, that the "fault" of all parties contributing to 
the injury must be compared, whether that fault is negligence 
or intentional conduct, or a combination of both. To rule 
otherwise would defeat the purpose of the applicable 
legislation. 
The plaintiff could easily undermine the purpose of this 
legislation by singling out a single defendant who, for 
MORRISON V, BOOTH PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
example, may have greater resources to satisfy a judgment than 
other defendants, and if that defendant were not able to 
compare the fault of other persons who had contributed to the 
injury then he would likely, if he had some fault, end up 
paying a greater proportion of the damages than his fair 
share. It is, of course, this precise thing that the 
legislation seeks to avoid. It is clear that the legislature 
wants defendants to pay only for damages that they themselves 
have caused. The fact that the conduct of some of the other 
defendants may have been intentional, is no reason to undermine 
the beneficial purpose of this legislation. Why would the 
legislature want defendants who are only negligent to run the 
risk of having to pay for the intentional conduct of other 
defendants while being so careful to insure that they do not 
run the risk of paying for the negligent conduct of other 
defendants? 
In the opinion of the Court, it makes much more sense in 
terms of judicial economy, and the savings of time and effort 
and attorney,s fees to allow a jury to compare the conduct of 
named defendants with the conduct of unnamed defendants who may 
have contributed to the injury, rather than requiring 
defendants to file third party complaints. Of course, 
MORRISON V. BOOTH PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
plaintiff was always at liberty from the beginning to name all 
individuals as defendants who may have contributed to her 
injury. 
Accordingly, defendants Motion to Compare the Fault of 
Robert Lee Boog, Jr. and Maren Matkin is granted. Assuming 
that there is some evidence of conduct on the part of these 
individuals that may have contributed to the plaintiff's 
injury, then the Court will allow their conduct to be compared 
on the Special Verdict form. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this ruling, and submit it in accordance with the Local 
Rules of Practice. 
Dated this^ W^-dav of June, 1991. 
fe/ frrttALLfiy /Urns { 
T R A N K G 7 NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MORRISON V, BOOTH PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this day of June, 1991: 
Frederick N. Green 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lowell V. Smith 
Richard K. Glauser 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Co-counsel for Defendant 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 700-38 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
